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Introduction 
On 1 January 2011, Hungary, the third member of the 
European Union to join the club in 2004, took over 
the presidency of the Council of the European Union. 
This represents the first presidency of a newer 
member state under Lisbon Treaty rules. After the 
new treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009, all 
rotating presidencies are, in a sense, first time 
presidencies. Their relative success now depends 
more on administrative ability than political 
leadership.  
In fact, the new treaty has completely changed the 
role of the rotating presidency. Before Lisbon, the 
political responsibility of each of these presidencies 
included almost all areas of the European project with 
the main decisions being brokered by national 
diplomats. Under the new system this ‘political’ 
dimension has been seriously curtailed, if not 
eradicated. The main task of rotating presidencies in 
the new institutional system of the European Union is 
to manage ongoing legislation within the Council and 
with the European Parliament. The most difficult 
dossiers, usually negotiated politically at the highest 
level of the European Council, are now no longer part 
of the rotating presidencies’ responsibilities. Even if 
the role of the rotating presidency is less relevant in 
the most difficult dossiers, its active engagement in 
negotiating legislation is absolutely crucial if the 
system is to function properly. Legislative 
responsibility is even more important in the specific 
context of economic instability and the eurozone crisis.  
In this new legal and political reality, the Hungarian 
Council presidency is the third in a series of three 
consecutive ‘trio’ presidencies. The first in this trio 
was Spain (January-June 2010) followed by Belgium 
(July-December 2010). Cooperation between the 
administrations of these states has been very close, 
with the result that the management and transfer of 
issues from the Belgian to the Hungarian desks over 
the New Year passed off smoothly.  
EU Council presidency priorities and a test of 
administrative capacity  
In November 2009, the then upcoming trio presidency 
published an 89-page document called “Draft 18 
month programme of the Council”.
1 It included a 
comprehensive list of all issues on the current EU 
agenda. Since then new points have arisen for the 
current presidency to deal with; the most important of 
which is the legislative implementation of the new 
economic governance rules as approved by the 
European Council in October 2010. In short, the 
Hungarian – and any other Council presidency – 
agenda is the EU agenda. The Hungarians seem to 
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understand clearly that, in principle, all priorities 
should already be on the EU agenda; introducing a 
new idea rarely brings tangible results during the six- 
month term.  
The Hungarian priorities fall into four main groups 
that will generate much effort, probably for little 
short-term reward. The presidency is a long-term 
investment in the capacity of country’s civil service. 
Previous presidencies have demonstrated that many 
months of hard work can easily be jeopardised by a 
political (mis)statement. The post-Lisbon reality 
means that there is also a new additional risk of 
irrelevance.  
Box 1. Priorities of the Hungarian presidency of the Council of the European Union: 
•  Priority one – Economy:  
o  To fast-track the six draft laws on economic governance through the legislative process; 
o  To translate the Europe 2020 strategy into law with a planned first assessment of the new strategy in 
March;  
o  To address the first formal Commission proposal in the run-up to the multi-annual financial perspective 
2014-2020 (expected by June); within this their initial priorities are: 
  To preserve the Cohesion Policy  
  To preserve the Common Agricultural Policy 
o  To assist (and hence, establish precedents) in the first-time dealing with the so-called ‘European semester’, 
a cycle of close economic policy coordination between the Ecofin Council and the European Commission, 
which will run between March and July.  
•  Priority two – balancing the traditional Union policies (i.e. agriculture, cohesion, etc.) with new challenges 
such as climate, innovation and energy:
2 
o  To translate into legislation the Commission’s ideas for a single European energy policy and the February 
2011 European Council decisions. The Commission’s November 2010 Communication: “Energy 2020: A 
strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy”
3 outlined a very ambitious agenda; steering this 
through the Council and the European Parliament is a major challenge for whoever is in the driving seat. 
As energy is mentioned as a policy priority by almost all Hungarian representatives, it is the one to watch 
for delivery. Any legislative success or failure to deliver (or, equally, a weak delivery) should be attributed 
to the rotating Council presidency’s account.  
•  Priority three – Citizens:  
o  This includes issues ranging from the implementation of the Stockholm Programme on justice and home 
affairs to socio-economic questions. One element, however, stands out: 
o  To adopt the EU’s strategy on the situation of the Roma people.  
•  Priority four – the Union, which “responsibly enlarges, globally engages”: 
o  To close accession negotiations with Croatia;  
o  To launch EU-brokered negotiations between Hungary’s neighbour Serbia and Kosovo; 
o  To enlarge the Schengen area to Romania and Bulgaria.  
•  Two additional highlights of the presidency are expected to be:  
o  The Eastern Partnership summit in May in Budapest; 
o  The launch of the Danube Strategy on macro-regional cooperation by April.  
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Under Lisbon rules, a successful rotating Council 
presidency needs two domestic elements. The first is 
dedication on the part of the political elites of the 
country and the second is a public administration 
committed to playing the role of honest broker in the 
Council. It is the civil servants and their skills that 
provide the strongest asset of any presidency in the 
fulfilment of its task. They work constantly to build 
their own and their state’s reputation in the eyes of the 
partners. They are engaged in hundreds of working 
groups and thousands of official and unofficial 
meetings at the same time. And they all strive towards 
a job done well; the one element they need most is 
also the most elusive: credibility. In the corridors of 
Brussels, credibility is probably the most desired 
virtue. Individuals, institutions and states work for 
many years to achieve it but it can be destroyed in 
seconds by a misplaced statement of a single 
politician.  
This is why success also depends on the dedication of 
the political elite. But at the same time their 
commitment has become more complex. One needs to 
expect the wolves (politicians) to dance the waltz 
(honest broker) in a situation offering no reward (no 
visibility). Interestingly, the Spanish and Belgian 
presidencies demonstrate different lessons in this 
respect. The Belgians experienced a major political 
crisis throughout the entire process. After early 
elections last June they were unable to form a 
majority government and the presidency was executed 
by the outgoing, caretaker government. However, the 
political elites remained committed to European 
affairs despite the problems ‘at home’ the Belgian 
presidency is widely regarded as having been a 
successful one. During the Belgian term a functional 
model for the role of the prime minister of the country 
holding the rotating presidency emerged, but it was a 
very specific model based on two elements not 
applicable elsewhere. First, the acting prime minister 
had no power to even try to challenge the leadership 
of Herman Van Rompuy, and as a caretaker 
government the Belgians had to focus on the 
competences they had: to administer. Second, Herman 
Van Rompuy is a Belgian and a former prime 
minister, which meant that most of the sitting (acting) 
ministers were ministers in his government – hence, 
the naturally close relationship between the sectoral 
Council formations and the permanent President. 
Such a close relationship would probably be most 
welcome in the future, also during the current 
semester, but it is as unlikely as it is necessary.  
Six months earlier, during the first half of 2010, Spain 
was run by a stable government with most of its 
ministers committed to a smooth presidency. There 
were, however, virtually no perks for the prime 
minister in the new system; after the first few weeks, 
Prime Minister Zapatero appeared detached to the 
outside world. This did not help the Spaniards in 
coordinating presidency meetings. A few crucial 
events, such as the cancellation of the EU-US summit, 
had a major effect on perceptions of the Spanish 
presidency. It became widely accepted that the 
presidency was largely irrelevant towards the end of 
the Spanish term, despite many of its officials 
performing their duties brilliantly.  
Domestic affairs  
There are more common features between the Spanish 
presidency of 2010 and the Hungarian one of 2011 
than between those of Hungary and Belgium. The 
Hungarian government is very stable and has a 
majority in parliament. At the same time Hungary is 
suffering major economic difficulties. It is benefiting 
from financial assistance devised by the EU and the 
IMF back in 2009, but it still requires major economic 
reconstruction and public debt reduction. Therefore, 
the natural focus of the government is more on its 
own economy than on anything else. At the same time 
both Spanish and Hungarian leaders were/are very 
well positioned within the European political parties 
(Zapatero was and remains the most important Social 
Democratic politician in Europe; and the position of 
Prime Minister Orbán in the European People’s Party 
is also very strong). Both leaders are, however, 
experienced politicians and rarely dedicate themselves 
to issues that are neither absolutely necessary nor 
politically profitable. One of the challenges for the 
Hungarian presidency is to maintain the commitment 
of the Hungarian leader to the cause.  
At the same time, having a stable government is an 
asset in itself. The chain of command and division of 
responsibilities are clearly established. Priorities are 
set and challenges are well identified.  
Another potential challenge comes from the public 
administration itself. With the elections last spring, 
the new Orbán government changed most of the civil 
servants responsible for running the presidency. 
Preparations for a presidency take years. This is not to 
say that the Hungarians are not managing, or that the 
new Hungarian Permanent Representative, who only 
took over in the summer of 2010, is underperforming; 
it is just that he and his presidency staff have different 
policies from those of their predecessors. Quite a few 
of the civil servants are simply learning on the job. 
The presidency also needs to remain open to 
assistance from other member states, especially the 
fellow trio-presidency civil servants from Spain and 
Belgium and from the General Secretariat of the 
Council.  
Hungarian leaders will probably have understood by 
now that replacing civil servants – however necessary 
in the eyes of the Hungarian government – has 
undermined EU trust in Hungary. The change in the 4 | Piotr Maciej Kaczyński 
media law last year brought a wave of criticism of the 
Hungarian government. Any more domestic changes 
of this nature will further undermine the perceived 
trustworthiness of those ruling in Budapest.  
The good news for the presidency, however, is that in 
the Lisbon reality, whatever the developments back 
home, as long as the presidency stays on course and 
the political leadership is dedicated and well-
coordinated – the presidency can still be deemed 
successful. The link between developments at home 
and the performance of the presidency is made only in 
January (or July, for the presidencies of the second 
semester). Later in the presidency visibility is 
significantly diminished (in January the College of 
Commissioners visited Budapest and Prime Minister 
Orbán addressed the European Parliament); the 
presidency then becomes much more low-profile. 
This will only work out if the Hungarian government 
remains committed and the civil servants are open to 
cooperation with others.  
As stated above, certain developments may challenge 
the commitment of the government, notably the 
fragility of the Hungarian economy. Over the past ten 
months the Orbán government has gained a reputation 
for unconventional and unpopular decisions and 
statements (i.e. on conditions of loans from the IMF 
or the pensions system). Second, if there are any 
major changes in the governance of Hungary, such as 
the December media law, more harsh criticism can be 
expected in the foreign media, possibly also from 
foreign politicians. One such change is already on the 
horizon; a reform of the constitution is planned for 
early spring. In such a situation the strong 
commitment of the Budapest government to EU 
affairs, including the Council presidency, cannot be 
fully assured.  
Conclusions and outlook  
There is one role the rotating presidency of the 
Council can play in the new institutional system of the 
European Union. It has to be a credible and honest 
broker. Without assuming such a role no success is 
possible, but neither can adoption of this role 
guarantee success in itself.  
The post-Lisbon institutional system has not yet fully 
bedded down. There is no firm model for the role of 
the prime minister of the country holding the rotating 
presidency of the Council. The Spanish and the 
Belgian presidencies left no sustainable blueprint for 
cooperation between the head of the rotating Council 
presidency and other institutions, most notably with 
the President of the European Council.  
Hence the challenge: if Prime Minister Orbán remains 
engaged and committed, what sort of relationship will 
there be between the President of the (rotating) 
Council Orbán and the President of the (permanent) 
European Council Van Rompuy?  
To conclude, here are eight benchmarks that should 
allow for an assessment of the rotating presidency of 
the Council performed by Hungary. On each of these 
elements they can either score ‘poorly’ (make a 
mistake or be proven irrelevant), ‘well’ (whereby any 
‘failure’ is not the result of a Hungarian presidency 
mistake) or ‘very well’ (where a maximum of what 
was possible and desirable was achieved).  
The eights benchmarks are:  
1.  Implementation of the six legislative proposals 
on economic governance within six months;  
2.  Adoption, or at least significant progress with 
first legislative proposals aimed at establishing 
an EU energy policy (depending on the timing 
of the Commission’s particular proposals);  
3.  Adoption of a meaningful and realistic 
European Roma Strategy with commitment for 
action at national levels;  
4.  Finalisation of the accession negotiations with 
Croatia;  
5.  Enlargement of the Schengen zone to Bulgaria 
and Romania in 2011;  
6.  Adoption of the Danube Strategy, which would 
be a) realistic; b) meaningful; and c) its launch 
will not be over-pompous;  
7.  Lack of negative reports on presidency 
mistakes (i.e. failed conciliations; procedural 
mistakes; or interfering with other actors’ 
competences, especially those of the High 
Representative and the President of the 
European Council);  
8.  A functional working model of cooperation 
with the European Council President. 
We will be assessing the performance of the 
Hungarian presidency against these benchmarks by 
the end of their term.  